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"This is the first book in international relations theory entirely devoted to the political thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. Focusing on the existential theology which lies at the basis of Reinhold Niebuhr's theory of international politics, it highlights the ways in which Niebuhrian realism was not only profoundly theological, but also constituted a powerful existentialist reconfiguration of the Realist tradition going back to Saint Augustine. Guilherme Marques Pedro offers an innovative account of Reinhold Niebuhr's eclectic thought, branching out into politics, ethics, history, society and religion and laying out a conceptual framework through which his work, as much as the realist tradition of international political thought as a whole, can be read. The book calls for the need to revisit classic thinkers within IR theory with an eye to their interdisciplinary background and as a way to remind ourselves of the issues that were at stake within the field as it was growing in autonomy and diversity--issues which remain, regardless of its disciplinary development, at the core of IR's concerns. This book offers an important contribution to IR scholarship, revealing the great historical wealth, intellectual originality but also the limitations and paradoxes of one of the greatest American political thinkers of the twentieth century."--Provided by publisher.

In this paper I explain how the now-called asymmetry is about this broader tension between law and morality. The hypothesis laid out in this paper is that what lies at the core of their troubled relationship has to do with a conflict of natural rights which has never been settled in the histories of both legal and political philosophy. My starting point is that while migration rights - namely the right to leave and the right to enter a state - have been theorised in the history of international law and political thought in light of a cosmopolitan (human and natural) right to mobility across the globe, the rights of states to bar immigration is instead seen as a positive artifice, and unnatural manmade creation that violates what would otherwise be the natural state of affairs. This paper historicises this division between a natural right of free movement - on which the so-called 'asymmetry thesis' rests - and the supposedly positive right to rule of sovereign states. But as in most cases of intellectual history, the history of philosophy is on its own also a type of philosophical argument. Hence, my historical overview highlights the notions of 'right' being employed by authors in their discussion of migration rights, as they seem to inform their views on migration law more generally - especially regarding the question as to whether the correlativity is a legal, a moral or a political problem. Different accounts and usages of rights provide for different theories of migration rights. They make all the difference for thescope and reach of both exit and entry rights in each author or theory, and this paper concludes that the categorisation of the problem as an 'asymmetry' has so far only made its way in moral theory, not in legal scholarship.

Many historians have highlighted the religious and social meaning of the right to freedom of conscience as well as the political role it played throughout the history of the religious wars of the late medieval period and their troubled and long appeasement in the peace settlements of Augsburg and Westphalia. The object of such right consisted, as we know, in the individual freedom to practice religion and in the corresponding negative duty of princes not to interfere with it. However, some historians also claim that this was no simple right: its relevance resided in its internal constitution as a 'cluster of rights', that is, a set of rights that depended on each other and operated together so as to make 'freedom of conscience' possible from both a de iure and a de facto point of view. Among them was the ius emigrandi, the right of members of religious groups to leave the realm, lest they be discriminated on the basis of their religious belief. This right hence correlated with the overall right of religious freedom of which it was an integral and essential part. 'Letting people go' hence played a stabilising role both in terms of civil peace but also among the sovereign states that were now the new makers of international order. This hidden aspect of the history of individual rights is of direct import to contemporary discussions on rights and their nature as well as to one of the most crucial aspects of current rights theories, that is, the issue of correlativity. The nature of the ius emigrandi thus sheds light on the potential set of relations that obtain with state duties but also with other rights, suggesting that its emergence as the first individual right in modern international law was not without geopolitical significance. It is in that context that I claim that the right of emigration started to be portrayed as a natural right by late medieval thinkers - following premodern reflections on a natural right to free movement but also on a natural right to life in early modern political and legal thought. This is was because the codification of emigration as a 'legal right' constituted an unprecedented challenge to political allegiance, and hence confronted what had also started to be characterised, under the theory of the divine right of kings, as the natural right to rule. What was at stake therefore was a conflict of natural rights. We must therefore revisit the philosophical grounds upon which certain rights were deemed as natural over others.

The right to migrate - usually also referred to in the latin original ius migrandi - describes at once a right to emigrate and a right to immigrate. This project focuses on both ends of this right and queries about the correlativity of exit and entry from a philosophical-legal viewpoint. What sort of right is the right to migrate? Is the correlation necessary? Is it desirable for the right to migrate to be conceived as a perfect right - or should we be satisfied with its apparently 'imperfect' nature? The asymmetry which this project sets out to problematic is the following: no one can leave a country without entering another. In other words, one can be legally entitled to leave my country, but what sort of entitlement is that if it does not grant him the legal possibility of entering another? Hence, for a right to be able to protect such individual conduct it must not only ensure the exit movement; it must also consist of a right of entry. In taking the wider perspective of the international system of states we are confronting the moral and legal validity of a right which can never be merely dependent on its enforcement by one single legal system. This project further reflects on the historical backdrop and the legal and political implications that a fully-fledged right to migrate can bring upon international law, international relations theory and the world system of states. It further wonders about whether certain rights - so-called 'international special (human) rights' - can only become enforceable - and hence be properly called "rights" - with the advent of a world Leviathan.

The aim of this paper is to query about the extent to which the moral right to migrate can be considered a legal right. Described by many as a natural right, the fundamental assumptions about what a natural right is has changed significantly in history - especially in the history of political and legal ideas - and so has the very notion of 'nature' which sits at the heart of both classical and modern natural law traditions. Hence, this paper asks what is the notion of nature that is presumed in the moral claim that migration is a 'natural' right. In order to respond to this question, I explore the connection between the classical ius migrandi and the modern freedom of movement, or right to free mobility, as the most recent corollary of that ancient principle. Freedom of movement has been hailed as a key aspect of the various human rights regimes that have developed since the Second World War and, overall, as a key component of any understanding of individual freedom and collective emancipation.